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Abstract This paper provides a general philosophical
groundwork for the theoretical and applied normative
evaluation of information generally and digital information
specifically in relation to the good life. The overall aim of
the paper is to address the question of how Information
Ethics and computer ethics more generally can be expan-
ded to include more centrally the issue of how and to what
extent information relates and contributes to the quality of
life or the good life, for individuals and for society. To
answer that question, the paper explores and provides by
way of a theoretical groundwork for further research, the
concept of wisdom understood as a type of meta-knowledge
as well as a type of meta-virtue, which can enable one to
both know in principle what a good life is and how to
successfully apply that knowledge in living such a life in
practice. This answer will be based on the main argument
presented in this paper that the notion of wisdom under-
stood as being at once a meta-epistemological, meta-axi-
ological and meta-eudemonic concept, provides the
essential conceptual link between information on the one
hand and the good life on the other. If, as we are told, this is
the Age of Information, both the theoretical examination
and analysis of the question of how information relates to
the good life and the provision of an adequate answer to
that question are essential for developing a deeper under-
standing of how to evaluate the theoretical and practical
implications and ramifications of information for the good
life, for individuals and societies generally.
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Knowledge  Wisdom  Dual obligation information
theory  Epistemology  Ethics  Axiology  Eudemonia 
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Introduction
Where is the Life we have lost in living?
Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?
Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?
T. S. Eliot Choruses from The Rock (1934)
The paper provides a general meta-philosophical ground-
work for the theoretical and applied normative evaluation
of information and digital information specifically in
relation to the good life. The overall aim of the paper is
to address the question of how Information Ethics and
computer ethics more generally can be expanded to include
more centrally the issue of how and to what extent
information relates and contributes to the quality of life or
the good life, for individuals and for society. To answer
that question, the paper explores and provides by way of a
theoretical groundwork for further research, the notion of
wisdom understood as a type of meta-knowledge and a type
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of meta-virtue that can enable one to both know in
principle what a good life is and how to go about applying
that knowledge in living such a life in practice. This answer
is based on the main argument presented in the paper that
the notion of wisdom understood as a composite epistemo-
logical, axiological and eudemonic concept provides the
essential conceptual link between information on the one
hand and the good life on the other. If as we are told this is
the Age of Information, both the theoretical examination of
the question of how information relates to the good life and
the provision of an adequate answer to that question are
essential for developing a deeper understanding of how to
evaluate the theoretical implications and practical ramifi-
cations of information for the good life, for individuals and
societies generally.
In offering this theoretical groundwork the paper, due to
constraints of space, will not provide a detailed examina-
tion and evaluation of specific normative issues, which
arise in the production, dissemination and use of digital
information in particular contexts and instances. It will,
however, provide in section ‘‘The application of wisdom
for the normative evaluation of digital information in
relation to the concept of a good life’’ a methodological
approach of how different types of some major practical
manifestations of digital information can be evaluated
using the meta-theoretical framework proposed in this
paper.
The paper comprises three main inter-related parts.
Section ‘‘A universal model for evaluating the normative
quality of digital information’’ provides a summary of an
argument whose primary aim is to demonstrate a meta-
philosophical model, the Dual Obligation Information
Theory (DOIT) (Spence 2009a) to be used in the analysis
and evaluation of digital information in terms of its
inherent normative categories. Those categories are the
epistemological and the ethical. As this argument has been
analyzed and demonstrated in much detail in an earlier
paper (Spence 2009b), section ‘‘A universal model for
evaluating the normative quality of digital information’’ of
the paper will merely provide a summary of that argument
in order to initiate, motivate and advance the main argu-
ment of this paper, which is that the notion of wisdom as at
once a meta-epistemological, meta-axiological and meta-
eudemonic concept provides the essential theoretical term
that conceptually links information to the good life. This
forms the overall objective of section ‘‘Information,
knowledge and wisdom’’ of the paper, which is, the
examination and evaluation of the theoretical and practical
relationship between information, knowledge and wisdom,
using as its point of departure the meta-philosophical
analysis provided by the Dual Obligation Information
Theory (DOIT) of section ‘‘A universal model for evalu-
ating the normative quality of digital information’’.
Of central importance, section ‘‘Information, knowledge
and wisdom’’, which provides the focal direction of the
paper, offers an innovative approach in evaluating infor-
mation and its relation to the good life, through the concept
of wisdom. Wisdom understood as a type of meta-infor-
mation or meta-knowledge, which comprises also essential,
ethical, axiological and eudemonic features, provides a
direct conceptual and practical link between the concepts
of information, knowledge and the good life. More gen-
erally, it provides a direct link between information ethics
and the good life. As such, the concept of wisdom allows
for a direct evaluation of information in relation to a
conception of a good life. Following on from sections ‘‘A
universal model for evaluating the normative quality of
digital information’’, and ‘‘Information, knowledge and
wisdom’’), the section, ‘‘The application of wisdom for the
normative evaluation of digital information in relation to
the concept of a good life’’ provides a theoretical rationale
to demonstrate the important and relevant role that wisdom
plays in the specific evaluation of digital information. To
that end, a methodological approach is used to show how
some different general types of practical manifestations of
digital information can be normatively evaluated in relation
to a conception of a good life through the application of the
concept of wisdom as developed in section ‘‘Information,
knowledge and wisdom’’.
However, before proceeding, we should first address the
general question of why wisdom is at all relevant to the
relationship between information and a good life? Why not
proceed directly to examining the role that information
itself plays in the good life? Why do we need the inter-
mediary concept of wisdom? The answer is fairly simple
and straightforward. Wisdom, and to repeat what was said
earlier, being at once a meta- axiological, meta-epistemo-
logical and meta-eudemonic term provides an immediate
and direct conceptual link between information (an epis-
temological term) and the good life (an axiological-eude-
monic term). As a meta-epistemological term, wisdom as a
form of meta-knowledge is capable of providing an indi-
vidual with the necessary reflective knowledge and under-
standing for evaluating and applying first-order knowledge,
which includes both knowledge that (theoretical knowl-
edge) and knowledge how (practical knowledge), in making
judgments to reach decisions that concern and impact on
different aspects of a person’s life (general aspects such as
capacities, constraints and circumstances). The ultimate
purpose of which is to assist and guide that person in living
a good life. For what would be the point of choosing and
leading a life that was not at least in principle capable of
providing a good life or at least, a life that is overall better
with wisdom than without it?
A basic pre-supposition of this paper is that the presence
of wisdom is, all things being equal, a better guide for a
262 E. H. Spence
123
good life than its absence or its semantic and conceptual
opposite, folly.1 The notion of wisdom that informs the
discussion of this paper and is developed in greater detail in
section ‘‘Information, knowledge and wisdom’’ is con-
ceived as forming a continuum comprising degrees of
wisdom. At the two extreme conceptual ends of the con-
tinuum we have wisdom (good = 1) and folly (bad = 0).
Most people, I speculate, probably fall somewhere in the
middle—they are neither wise nor foolish.
Yet another reason why wisdom is relevant to an
enquiry concerning the role that information plays in a
good life is that some of the issues with regard to the use of
digital information qua good life relate not to moral or
immoral conduct by an individual towards others but to the
prudentially appropriate or inappropriate conduct of the
individual in relation to themselves. For example, if an
individual posts compromising pictures of themselves on
Facebook or Myspace that causes no harm to anyone else
but themselves, then the matter is not one of ethics but one
of wisdom or at least prudence2—how wise or prudent was
the individual to do so, if the outcome of their unwise or
foolish behavior in public cyberspace turned out to be
harmful to themselves in some way—say, as a result of
their unwise or foolish conduct that individual was fired
from a job that they enjoyed.
In sum, the paper will seek to show that although rela-
ted, wisdom is conceptually distinct and conceptually dif-
ferent from both information and knowledge in a crucial
way. For wisdom unlike information and first-order
knowledge provides a person with understanding con-
cerning the techne biou or craftsmanship of living in the
sense of knowing how to evaluate and apply relevant
information or knowledge for the attainment of a good life
and in addition, an appreciation in knowing why such a life
constitutes a good life. This is similar to the notion of
wisdom defended by Sharon Ryan who in her article
‘‘What is Wisdom?’’ concludes that an accurate answer to
that question is that ‘‘S is wise if S knows, in general, how
to live well and if S has a general appreciation of the true
value of living well (Ryan 1999, pp. 119–39). Ryan’s
views on wisdom will be discussed in more detail in sec-
tion ‘‘Information, knowledge and wisdom’’ of the paper.
In a nutshell, the argument I advance in this paper for
the evaluation of information (including digital informa-
tion) in relation to the good life, through the intermediary
concept of wisdom, is as follows3:
(1) The dissemination of information as a process of
communication entails a number of general epistemo-
logical and ethical values and norms that are necessary
and universal for all informational agents in virtue of
the inherent normative structure of Information AND
the inherent normative structure of Action. Informa-
tional Action therefore has a dual inherent normative
structure that commits all informational agents to
general epistemological and ethical values and norms.
This is the conclusion of the argument from the Dual
Information Obligation Theory addressed in section
‘‘A universal model for evaluating the normative
quality of digital information’’.
(2) Moreover, wisdom as a form of meta-knowledge
about what a good life is, the value of such a life, and
how to actively pursue and realize it, is a reflective
meta-virtue whose possession enables the evaluation
and application of first-order knowledge in the
promotion of the good life for its attainment, both
for an individual, and society generally.
(3) Since wisdom requires information and knowledge
oriented towards the realization of the good life, and
since the acquisition and communication of such
knowledge entails epistemic and ethical norms, as
well as axiological and eudemonic values that relate
to the good life, wisdom is therefore central and
crucial to the evaluation of information, including
digital information, and its relation to the good life.
Hence, the normative structure of informational action
as discussed in section ‘‘A universal model for evaluating
the normative quality of digital information’’ is shown to
have a common conceptual connection with wisdom with
regard to the promotion and attainment of a good life, as
discussed in sections, ‘‘Information, knowledge and wis-
dom’’ and ‘‘The application of wisdom for the normative
evaluation of digital information in relation to the concept
of a good life’’ of this paper. Moreover, the argument as
outlined above and discussed at length in what follows,
demonstrates that Information Ethics by implication and by
rational extension becomes the Ethics of Wisdom.
1 Erasmus of course in Praise of Folly makes a case, albeit an ironic
and satiric one, that Folly is in fact a better guide than Wisdom for
having a good life in this world. On the serious side, Erasmus,
however, goes on to suggest in the last section of In Praise of Folly
that since only God is capable of wisdom and human-beings only
capable of folly we should submit ourselves to the will and guidance
of God. Being primarily a secular examination of the role of wisdom
in a good life, this paper will not, however, pursue that theological
line of inquiry interesting though it might be.
2 The term prudence used throughout this paper refers to the virtue of
prudence conceived as an enabling disposition or trait of character
that has the tendency of preventing an individual of engaging in
conduct that is likely to cause them harm. That is, conduct
unbecoming of a virtuous person. Unlike the term instrumental
rationality, which is a non-moral term and refers to the non-moral
self-interest of an individual, prudence by contrast refers to the
virtuous and hence moral self-interest of an individual person.
3 I owe with gratitude the initial prompting and basis for the
formulation of this summation of my argument to one of the
reviewers of this paper.
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A universal model for evaluating the normative quality
of digital information4
The object of this part of the paper is to describe and
demonstrate in summary a meta-theoretical framework for
the normative evaluation of digital information in terms of
its inherent epistemological and ethical categories. The
primary aim for doing so is to demonstrate in the first
instance the conceptual relationship between information
and knowledge and the epistemological and ethical com-
mitments to which information understood as a type of
knowledge gives rise. As mentioned earlier, the argument
for the inherent normative structure of information as a
process of communicative action has been examined and
demonstrated at length in a previous publication devoted
exclusively to that topic (Spence 2009a). In this part of the
paper my concern is simply to provide a summary of that
argument sufficient for establishing an initial theoretical
standpoint from which to further motivate and develop the
normative relationship between information, knowledge,
wisdom and the good life that forms the main topic of
discussion in section ‘‘Information, knowledge and wis-
dom’’. The demonstration of that normative relationship, at
once epistemological, axiological and eudemonic, will
establish and demonstrate a direct normative link between
information and the good life. Its purpose is to provide a
methodological approach in terms of a wisdom-theoretic
model for the normative evaluation of that relationship and
its implications and ramifications for individuals and
societies generally.
The inherent normative structure of information
and knowledge
In describing the Dual Obligation Information Theory
(DOIT) used for the normative evaluation of information in
terms of its inherent epistemological and ethical categories
the paper will employ an epistemological account of
semantic information based on a minimal nuclear definition
of information (Dretske 1999, p. 45). Following Floridi
information is defined as ‘‘well-formed meaningful data that
is truthful’’ (2005) and following Dretske information is
defined as ‘‘an objective commodity capable of yielding
knowledge’’ and knowledge, in turn, is defined as ‘‘infor-
mation caused belief’’ (Dretske 1999, pp. 44–45 and 86).
The reference to both Floridi’s and Dretske’s notions of
information in this paper is not intended for making any
critical theoretical comparisons between those two
accounts of information (which entirely lies beyond the
scope of this paper). It is rather intended for highlighting
the one essential element that those accounts have in
common, namely, that what is necessary for both infor-
mation and knowledge is truth. For information without
truth is not strictly speaking information but either misin-
formation (the unintentional dissemination of well-formed
and meaningful false data) or disinformation (the inten-
tional dissemination of false ‘‘information’’).
Using the minimal account of information described
above, we can now develop an inherent normative account
of information, which demonstrates and describes the
generic epistemological and ethical commitments that
necessarily arise in the dissemination of semantic infor-
mation, specifically as a process of communication.
Briefly, the argument is as follows (Spence 2009a):
Insofar as information is a type of knowledge (it must be
capable of yielding knowledge, one must be able to learn
from it) it must comply with the epistemological conditions
of knowledge, specifically, that of truth. And insofar as the
dissemination of information is based on the justified and
rightful expectation among its disseminators and especially
its users that such information should meet the minimal
condition of truth, then the disseminators of information
are committed to certain widely recognized and accepted
epistemological criteria. Those epistemic criteria will in the
main comprise the objectivity as well as the independence,
reliability, accuracy and trustworthiness of the sources that
generate the information. The epistemology of information,
in turn, commits its disseminators to certain ethical prin-
ciples, values and virtues, such as honesty, sincerity,
truthfulness, trustworthiness and reliability (also episte-
mological values), and fairness, including justice, which
requires the equal distribution of the informational goods to
all citizens. Thus in terms of its dissemination, as a process
of communication, information has an intrinsic normative
structure that commits everyone involved in its creation,
production, search, communication, consumption and
multiple other uses to epistemological and ethical norms.
These norms being intrinsic to the normative structure of
information with regard to all its disseminating modes are
rationally unavoidable and thus not merely optional.
Information and universal rights
The object of the following associated argument to the one
above (Spence 2009a) is to show that in addition of com-
mitting its disseminators to unavoidable epistemological
and ethical standards by virtue of its own inherent nor-
mative structure in terms of truth, information as a process
of communication commits its disseminators to respect for
peoples’ rights to freedom and wellbeing. This is so by
virtue of the inherent normative structure of action and
specifically informational action, due to its essential
4 This model is presented in greater detail in Spence (2009a),
A Universal Model for the Normative Evaluation of Internet Infor-
mation., Ethics and Information Technology, 11 (4).
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features of freedom and wellbeing (Spence 2006; Gewirth
1978).5 Insofar as the communication of information con-
stitutes a type of informational action, information as a
process and product of communication must not be dis-
seminated in ways that violate peoples’ fundamental rights
to freedom and wellbeing (generic rights), individually or
collectively, or undermine their capacity for self-fulfilment
(negative rights).
In addition, information must as far as possible be dis-
seminated in ways that secure and promote peoples’ gen-
eric rights and capacity for self-fulfilment (positive rights)
when those rights cannot be secured or promoted by the
individuals themselves and can be so secured and promoted
at no comparable cost to its disseminators.6 Due to con-
strains of space, I will not attempt to provide a justification
for Alan Gewirth’s argument for the Principle of Generic
Consistency (PGC) on which his derivation of rights is
based, as this is well beyond the scope and limits of this
paper.7
In conclusion of sections ‘‘The inherent normative
structure of information and knowledge’’ and (‘‘Informa-
tion and universal rights’’), the Dual Obligation Informa-
tion Theory (DOIT) demonstrates the doubly-normative
structure of informational action, to which all informa-
tional agents, including the media (both corporate and new
media) are committed by universal necessity. It does so by
firstly disclosing the inherent normative structure of
information as a process of communication and secondly
by disclosing the inherent normative structure of commu-
nication as a type of informational action. Hence, infor-
mation as a process of communication can generally be
epistemologically and ethically evaluated internally by
reference to its inherent normative structure. That structure
commits its disseminators, to ethical and epistemological
norms. This is especially true of professional communi-
cators (Journalists and PR Consultants, for example,
on-line and off-line). Expressive Information can also be
evaluated in this way. For example, identity theft on the
Internet is morally wrong both because it is untruthful and
because it can cause harm (violates the individual’s rights
whose identity has been stolen).
Information, knowledge and wisdom8
Information and the good informational agent
Although the Dual Obligation Information Theory (DOIT)
provides a meta-theoretical model for evaluating informa-
tion in terms of epistemological and ethical categories, it
does not, at least not directly, provide a method for the
evaluation of information in terms of a normative axio-
logical category in relation to the notion of a good life.
DOIT, however, does initially provide a method for an
indirect axiological evaluation of information through the
notion of a good person and in particular a good infor-
mational person or good informational agent. Consider the
following argument. I will refer to it as the Argument from
the Goodness of Informational Agents (GIA): (a) Since
DOIT requires all agents, including informational agents,
to act epistemically and ethically (or at least acknowledge
that they ought to act epistemically and ethically) in
respecting the rights to freedom and wellbeing of other
informational agents including their own; and (b) insofar as
virtues of character such as the cardinal virtues of justice,
courage, moderation and prudence; the epistemic virtues of
communication such as honesty, sincerity, truthfulness,
trustworthiness and reliability; as well as the Humean
moral sentiments, such as sympathy (positive) and remorse
(negative), can be conceived as enabling dispositions that
allow agents generally and informational agents specifi-
cally to act epistemically and ethically in compliance with
DOIT; then (c) the inculcation of those virtues and culti-
vation of those sentiments are also rationally required, at
least prudentially (Spence 2006, chapter 5, 2009a). For if
one recognises the value of acting epistemically and ethi-
cally as an informational agent as well as recognises the
value of the virtues and moral sentiments as enabling dis-
positions in achieving that objective, then one ought to also
rationally recognise and acknowledge the value of
5 Alan Gewirth’s main thesis in Reason and Morality (1978) is that
every rational agent, in virtue of engaging in action, is logically
committed to accept a supreme moral principle, the Principle of
Generic Consistency that commits every agent to respect the rights of
freedom and wellbeing of all other agents including their own. The
basis of his thesis is found in his doctrine that action has an inherent
normative structure whose necessary features are freedom and
wellbeing, and because of this structure every rational agent, just in
virtue of being an agent, is committed to certain necessary prudential
and moral constraints and in particular respect for all agents’ rights to
freedom and wellbeing.
6 Gewirth. The Community of Rights. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1996, and E. Spence. Ethics Within Reason: A Neo-
Gewirthian Approach. Lanham: Lexington Books (a division of
Rowman and Littlefield), 2006.
7 For a detailed exposition and analysis of Gewirth’s argument for the
PGC see E. Spence. Ethics Within Reason: A Neo-Gewirthian
Approach. Lanham: Lexington Books (a division of Rowman and
Littlefield), 2006.
8 Surprisingly, very little has been written on this relationship
in the philosophical literature, specifically with regard to information
ethics. The main sources I will refer to in this part of the paper,
but not exclusively, are Maxwell (2007), Tiberius (2008), Vitek
and Jackson (2008), Varelius (2004), Kvanvig (2003), Finnis (1980,
1983), Ryan (2007, 1999), Kekes (1995); and generally the writings
of Plato (Apology), Aristotle (Nichomachean Ethics) and the Hellenis-
tic Philosophers (Epicureans, Sceptics and Stoics)—for a discussion
of those see (Spence 2006, Ch. 10).
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inculcating those virtues and moral sentiments in one’s
character. At the very least, given that rational recognition
and acknowledgement, it would be prudent for one to do
so.
Information and the good life
Having initially and indirectly provided a conceptual link
between information and the notion of a good informa-
tional agent above, on the basis of the Argument from the
Goodness of Informational Agents (GIA), it is now time to
examine the relationship between information and the
notion of a good life more directly. At first approximation,
we can say quite reasonably that a good life generally is
one that is at least minimally capable of enabling a person
to attain self-fulfillment, well-being, happiness or eude-
monia. I will for methodological convenience use the term
eudemonia9 to include and refer to all those concepts col-
lectively whilst maintaining the original meaning for that
term as intended by the ancient Greek philosophers,
including Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic philosophers
and in particular the Stoics and the Epicureans (see Spence
2006, Ch. 10). Although those philosophers might have
explained the notion and attainment of eudemonia in dif-
ferent ways they all at least agreed that the virtues were
essential for the attainment of a eudemonic or a flourishing
life and moreover the virtues were constitutive of such a
life. For insofar as eudemonia is the ultimate object in life
as Aristotle claimed, it is difficult to conceive a life that
was not at least capable of leading to the attainment of
eudemonia, as good—what would it be good for if it were
incapable of at least in principle enabling one to realize
one’s ultimate objective in life?
Furthermore we can say initially and pending further
discussion in section ‘‘Information, knowledge and wisdom
and their relationship to the good life’’ that a good life for
an informational agent is, in turn, capable of enabling the
attainment of eudemonia for that informational agent in the
infosphere (Floridi and Sanders 2002) if it accords with the
minimal normative epistemological and ethical require-
ments mandated by the Dual Obligation Information The-
ory (DOIT).As we saw earlier those requirements can more
successfully be complied with through the inculcation of
the virtues and the moral sentiments, in accordance with an
indirect application of DOIT on the basis of the Argument
from the Goodness of Informational Agents (GIA). That is
to say, a good life capable of leading to or at least con-
tributing to the eudemonia of informational agents or
informational beings is more likely to be realizable if one is
a good informational agent or a good informational
being—that is, if one has a good character comprising both
the moral virtues and moral sentiments. And by being good
one is also more likely to comply with the mandatory
requirements of DOIT in respecting the rights (both ethical
and epistemological) of other informational agents
including one’s own.
Information, knowledge and wisdom and their
relationship to the good life
This is the focal and main part of the paper whose aim is
the examination and evaluation of the relationship between
the concepts of information, knowledge and wisdom.
Approximately and pending further discussion below,
wisdom in this paper is conceived as a type of meta-
knowledge that is used in the evaluation and application of
information and knowledge to make right judgments in
reaching appropriate decisions that are of value and good
for us in our lives personally (prudentially and eudemoni-
cally good) and that are of value and good for others in
their lives (ethically good) for the ultimate attainment of a
good life resulting in eudemonia. The overall objective of
this line of enquiry is to further determine what the rela-
tionship between information and the good life is and to
what degree, if any, information can in principle contribute
to a good life.
In section ‘‘Information and the good life’’ we saw how
information can initially be indirectly related to the notion
of a good life though the axiological notion of a good agent
and specifically a good informational agent. In this part of
the paper, we shall examine more closely how information
can be directly related to the notion of a good life via the
concept of wisdom: if wisdom is a primary and essential
condition for an individual in (a) determining what a good
life is or ought to be (meta-knowledge- that and meta-
knowledge- why) and (b) a primary and essential condition
in providing us with guidance and direction, both as indi-
viduals and societies generally, of how to live such good
lives and (c) moreover, wisdom, as a reflective meta-virtue
is an enabling disposition of character that practically
enables us to live such good lives for the attainment of
eudemonia (meta-knowledge-how), to what extent and in
what ways, if any, does information contribute to wisdom
and by extension to the good life?
The paper posits that one direct way of evaluating the
value of information and its relation to a good life generally
9 For the purposes of this paper I will use the notions of eudemonia
and eudemonic pluralistically as being potentially compatible with
various different theories of the good life, including hedonistic,
desire-satisfaction and objective-list theories among others. Simply
put, the notion of a good life used in this paper is a good life that is in
principle capable of leading to the attainment of eudemonia. As such,
any theory of a good life capable of leading to eudemonia can at least
in theory and upon further demonstration be considered a eudemonic
life. My own theoretical preference is a eudemonic life that includes
the virtues but that need not exclude other theories capable of also
leading to the attainment of eudemonia.
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(its overall axiological goodness) is by determining the
degree to which it contributes or is capable of contributing
to the attainment of a good life epistemologically (its
capacity to yield knowledge), ethically (its ability to con-
tribute to the moral good of others both negatively by
causing no unjustified harm to others, and positively by
causing positive good for others) and eudemonically (its
capacity to contribute to both the conception and the
attainment of a good life). The paper will show that in
order to achieve that theoretical objective the notion of
wisdom is essentially required.
Analyzing information through the application of the
concept of meta-knowledge (knowledge-that, knowledge-
how and knowledge-why) of what is good or evil for us and
others—how it contributes or is capable of contributing to a
good life for us and others for the attainment of eudemo-
nia—is what the paper will initially postulate as Wisdom.
In sum, if a good life should at least be capable of leading
to self-fulfilment or eudemonia (otherwise what is it good
for?), especially self-fulfilment as capacity-fulfilment
(making the best of oneself as a human-being—Gewirth
1998)10 then wisdom (understood as a type of meta-
knowledge, the acquisition of which enables one to create,
communicate and use information so as to render oneself
and others, whenever possible, capable of achieving self-
fulfilment and eudemonia) is a necessary condition for a
good life.
An important qualification to the claim made in this
paper that wisdom is a necessary condition for a good life
is that such a life is conceived eudemonically. For the
notion of wisdom developed in this paper and applied in
evaluating the axiological goodness of information is itself
a eudemonic conception of wisdom. However, such a
eudemonic notion of wisdom is not unlike our common-
sense and pre-theoretical understanding of wisdom,
namely, an overarching reflective capacity the possession
of which allows one to lead a good life and moreover
enables one to guide others in leading fulfilling and good
lives. This eudemonic notion of wisdom is akin to the
notions of wisdom defended by philosophers such as Plato,
Aristotle, the Epicureans and the Stoics, and later Kant and
Gewirth11 who although postulated and defended some-
what different notions of the good life, can nevertheless
collectively be thought of as offering eudemonic accounts
of the good life.
It can be said that a common denominator for all the
above cited eudemonic accounts of wisdom is their sub-
ordination of the concepts of pleasure and desire to that of
virtue. The essential link between pleasure and desire on
the one hand and virtue on the other might be weaker in the
case of the Epicureans and stronger in the case of the Stoics
but whatever the strength of that relationship might be, the
link between pleasure, desire and virtue is an essential
characteristic of traditional eudemonic conceptions of a
good life and also eudemonic conceptions of wisdom.
Moreover, as mentioned above, another essential charac-
teristic of a eudemonic conception of a good life is that
such a life is capable of resulting in the attainment of
eudemonia. As such, the term eudemonic understood in this
very general sense is compatible with a number of other
theories of the good life which can be shown to be capable
of leading to the attainment of eudemonia. This is in
keeping with the Eudemonist Axiom, the view that ‘‘hap-
piness is desired by all human beings as the ultimate end or
telos of all rational action’’.
Importantly, the relationship between wisdom and a
good life proposed in this paper under a eudemonic con-
ception of a good life is reflexive. For wisdom guides one
to the choice of a eudemonic conception of a good life and
the pursuit of such a life, and a eudemonic conception of a
good life, in turn, guides and motivates one to the acqui-
sition of wisdom as an enabling disposition, in the form of
an overarching reflective virtue, which is necessary for the
attainment of a eudemonic life. This should not surprise us.
For although wisdom acts initially instrumentally, as a
necessary enabling virtuous disposition for the attainment
of a eudemonic life, once attained, a eudemonic life
becomes inseparable from the state of wisdom that enabled
its attainment. This reflexivity between eudemonia and
wisdom allows us then to say that a wise person is gen-
erally a eudemonic person and a eudemonic person is
generally a wise person. However, I don’t wish to exclude
the logical possibility that one could be wise but unhappy
although pragmatically, given our common understanding
of wisdom, that would be an odd thing to say and in
practice I think, an unusual occurrence.
What is wisdom?
Having examined in some detail what information and
knowledge are and what the relationship is that exists
between them (by way of an examination of the essential
property that characterises both, namely, the property of
truth) it is now time to turn our attention to the notion of
wisdom so as to explore further the conceptual relation-
ship that holds between information, wisdom and a good
life.
According to Nicholas Maxwell,
10 In Spence 2006, Chapter 10, I demonstrate how Gewirth’s notion
of self-fulfillment as capacity-fulfillment, is conceptually similar to
the Stoic notion of eudemonia.
11 In Spence (2006) Ethics Within Reason: A Neo-Gewirthian
Approach, Chapter 10, I argue for a Neo-Stoic interpretation of
Gewirth’s notion of self-fulfilment in terms of the Greek notion of
eudemonia.
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The central task of inquiry is to devote reason to the
enhancement of wisdom – wisdom being understood
here as the desire, the active endeavour, and the
capacity to discover and achieve what is desirable
and of value in life, both for oneself and for others.
Wisdom includes knowledge and understanding but
goes beyond them in also including: the desire and
active striving for what is of value, the ability to see
what is of value, actually and potentially, in the cir-
cumstances of life, the ability to experience value, the
capacity to help solve those problems of living that
arise in connection with attempts to realize what is of
value, the capacity to use and develop knowledge,
technology and understanding as needed for the
realization of value. Wisdom, like knowledge, can be
conceived of, not only in personal terms, but also in
institutional or social terms. We can thus interpret the
philosophy of wisdom as asserting: the basic task of
rational inquiry is to help us develop wiser ways of
living, wiser institutions, customs and social rela-
tions, a wiser world (2007, 79).
What is of interest in Maxwell’s quoted passage for our
present purposes is the relationship he draws between the
concepts of reason, knowledge, understanding, and the
desire, capacity, and active endeavour for the achievement
(or as in my case attainment) of what is of value in life, for
oneself and others. With the exception of understanding,
for which I will have more to say in what follows, the other
concepts to which Maxwell draws attention seems to
anticipate and reflect both explicitly and implicitly, the
concepts included in my own normative analysis of infor-
mation and knowledge, in terms of their epistemological,
ethical, and axiological dimensions. The basis of that
analysis is the meta-theoretical framework comprising the
Dual Obligation Information Theory and the Argument
from the Goodness of Informational Agents.
Four theories of wisdom
In an article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Ryan (2007) identifies at least four different theories of
wisdom: (A) Wisdom as Epistemic Humility, which she
attributes to Socrates in Plato’s Apology (20e–23c). There
Socrates expresses puzzlement concerning the oracle of
Delphi’s pronouncement that he is the ‘‘wisest of men’’ and
declares that his knowledge extends only as far as his
knowledge of his own ignorance, the prototype case of
epistemic humility (B) Wisdom as Epistemic Accuracy, for
which Ryan provides two versions to the effect that (B1)
S is wise iff for all p, (S believes S knows p iff S knows p.)
(EA1) or the weaker version (B2) S is wise iff for all p,
(S believes S knows p iff S’s belief in p is highly justified.)
(EA2); (C) Wisdom as Knowledge: the view that knowl-
edge is at least a necessary condition of wisdom. Ryan
identifies several philosophers who hold some version of
(C) including Aristotle (1941, VI, Ch. 7), Descartes, R.
(1979, pp. 201–302).), Garrett (1996), Kekes (1983),
Lehrer et al. (1996), Nicholas Maxwell (2007), Robert
Nozick (1989), Plato (1978), and Ryan (1996, 1999).
According to Ryan, all these philosophers ‘‘have theories
of wisdom that require a wise person to have some
knowledge of some sort’’ and what’s more, ‘‘all these
views maintain that wise people know what is important’’
(2007). Overall, these theories differ according to Ryan
‘‘over what it is that the wise person must know and
whether there is any action that is required for wisdom’’
(2007).
In order to further differentiate different notions of
wisdom that fall under the broad category of ‘‘wisdom as
knowledge’’ Ryan refers to Aristotle who held two main
theories of wisdom, Sophia or Theoretical Wisdom and
Phronesis or Practical Wisdom. Theoretical wisdom
according to Aristotle is ‘‘scientific knowledge, combined
with intuitive reason, of the things that are highest by
nature (Ryan 2007 quoting Aristotle in Nichomachean
Ethics, VI, 1141b). On that basis, Ryan interprets Aris-
totle’s notion of theoretical wisdom as the following view:
(C1) Wisdom as extensive factual knowledge (WFK) which
in effect amounts to ‘‘S is wise iff S has extensive factual
knowledge about science, history, philosophy, literature,
music, etc.’’ (Ryan 2007). Ryan finds this notion of wisdom
implausible for as she correctly observes ‘‘some of the
most knowledgeable people are not wise’’ (Ryan 2007).
Ryan maintains that Aristotle’s notion of phronesis or
practical wisdom is a more reasonable theory to hold.
According to Aristotle,
Now it is thought to be the mark of a man of practical
wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is
good and expedient for himself, not in some partic-
ular respect, e.g. about what sorts of things conduce
to health or strength, but about what sorts of things
conduce to the good life in general (Nichomachean
Ethics, VI, 1140a01140b).
Ryan concludes that ‘‘for Aristotle, practical wisdom
requires knowing, in general, how to live well’’. She goes
on to say that although many philosophers are in agreement
with Aristotle on this point they would not agree with
Aristotle ‘‘that theoretical wisdom is one kind of wisdom
and practical wisdom another. Wisdom, in general,’’ Ryan
concludes, ‘‘requires practical wisdom’’ (2007). I agree.
In support of this general notion of practical wisdom
Ryan cites Robert Nozick who claims that ‘‘Wisdom is
what you need to understand in order to live well and cope
with the central problems and avoid the dangers in the
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predicaments human beings find themselves in’’ (Nozick
1989, p. 267). She also cites John Kekes, whose view is
that ‘‘what a wise man knows, therefore, is how to con-
struct a pattern that, given the human situation, is likely to
lead to a good life (Kekes 1983, p. 280). Ryan defines this
type of general practical wisdom as (C2) Wisdom as
Knowing How to Live Well (KLW): ‘‘S is wise iff S knows
how to live well’’, which according to Ryan captures on the
whole Aristotle’s concept of practical wisdom as well as
the views held by Nozick et al. (2007).
The final theory of wisdom that Ryan considers is
Wisdom as Knowledge and Action, which she specifically
defines as Wisdom as Knowing How To, and Succeeding at,
Living Well (KLS), which in effect amounts to: S is wise iff
(i) S knows how to live well, and (ii) S is successful at
living well (2007). According to Ryan the ‘‘idea of the
success condition [condition (ii) in KLS] is that one puts
one’s knowledge into practice’’. She goes on to attribute a
view broadly along the lines of (KLS) to Aristotle (his
notion of practical wisdom), as well as to Kekes and
Nozick. Ryan herself rejects this theory based on criticisms
she raises in (Ryan 1999) but her main criticism with which
I concur is that (KLS) seems to leave out the factual
knowledge required by the theory of wisdom as extensive
factual knowledge (WFK).
In agreement with Ryan I also claim that some factual
knowledge of the world (but not necessarily extensive)
adequate for enabling a person to make their way in the
world and have a good life, is necessary for wisdom. This
consideration introduces an important distinction when
enquiring into the conceptual connection between knowl-
edge and wisdom: the distinction between knowledge for
wisdom and knowledge as wisdom. Although related the
two are quite different and their difference highlights an
important and crucial distinction between knowledge and
wisdom.
No doubt some general knowledge about the world
acquired on the basis of reliable and veridical information
that causes it and sustains it (Dretske 1999) is necessary for
wisdom. This is in keeping with the notion of Socratic
ignorance, roughly understood here as having knowledge
of one’s ignorance (being aware of one’s ignorance and
humbly acknowledging one’s lack of knowledge). For
Socratic ignorance prompts and motivates one to acquire
the knowledge of which one is ignorant (knowledge
understood here as some minimal general knowledge about
some basic aspects of the world, e.g., history, geography,
science, mathematics, literature, art, etc.). Socratic igno-
rance as a special type of knowledge accords with Ryan’s
theory of wisdom as epistemic humility, which was
examined earlier. By contrast, those who claim to know
what they lack knowledge of, are not in a position to be
motivated to acquire the knowledge they lack; and
moreover, the knowledge that is at least in a minimal and
general sense partly necessary for the acquisition of wis-
dom and by extension, the attainment of a good life and
eudemonia.
Thus at a minimum, and bracketing the possibility that
‘‘holy fools’’ though totally ignorant of facts about the
world are nevertheless in some sense ‘‘wise’’, some mini-
mal and general knowledge about the world is instrumen-
tally and prudentially necessary for the acquisition of
wisdom. At least at a minimum, an attitude of Socratic
ignorance12 might be necessary for the acquisition of
wisdom. For the Socratic elenchus can be applied as a
method for acquiring the knowledge one lacks, through
first recognizing and acknowledging one’s ignorance, and
then being motivated to gradually acquire the knowledge of
which one is ignorant, through critical enquiry and further
investigation. According to John Kekes, ‘‘the elenchus
enables its practitioners to progress from a special kind of
ignorance—foolishness—to a special kind of knowledge—
moral wisdom’’ (1995, p. 39).
We can therefore say that the acquisition of such general
minimal knowledge about the world or an attitude of
Socratic ignorance when we lack such knowledge is
instrumental to the acquisition of wisdom because it pro-
vides at least part of the necessary means, that is, the
capacity for the acquisition of wisdom. Moreover,
the acquisition of such minimal and general knowledge of
the world or in its absence, an adoption of an attitude of
Socratic ignorance, is prudential to the acquisition of
wisdom. Insofar as we consider the acquisition of wisdom
desirable, valuable and essential for the attainment of a
good life, we should (normatively) inculcate in ourselves
the virtue of learning: the desire and active pursuit of the
acquisition of at least a minimal and general knowledge
about the world. Hence, some minimal and general
knowledge about the world is necessary for wisdom.
Where I disagree with Ryan with regard to her formu-
lation for (KLS), however, is her claim that one’s practical
knowledge in living well when put into practice should
necessarily succeed in one’s living well. After all, cir-
cumstance beyond one’s control and the ‘‘arrows of out-
rageous fortune’’ might frustrate one’s best efforts in
succeeding to live well. My re-formulation of KLS is a
modification of Ryan’s fourth theory of wisdom as
knowledge and action to, Wisdom as Knowing How to Live
Well and Successfully Applying that Knowledge in Living
Well (KLSA), which amount to S is wise iff (i) S knows
how to live well, and (ii) S successfully applies that
knowledge at living well. According to my re-formulation
12 For a detailed discussion of the Socratic elenchus and Socratic
wisdom see Benson (2000) Socratic Wisdom: The Model of Knowl-
edge in Plato’s Early Dialogues, Oxford University Press.
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of KLS as KLSA, it is actual successful application of the
knowledge of how to live well rather than actually suc-
ceeding in living well that is important. A subtle difference
perhaps, but I think an important one. For my re-formu-
lation of KLS in terms of KLSA avoids the problem of
rendering wisdom a hostage to fortune. One can be wise
even though, because of circumstances beyond one’s con-
trol, one fails to succeed in living well. It is sufficient that
one both knows how to live well and one successfully
applies that knowledge of how to live well, regardless of
one’s actual success or failure in living well.
In addition, along with Aristotle, I also wish to claim
that being a good person is a necessary, if not sufficient,
condition for being wise. For Aristotle claims, ‘‘Therefore
it is evident that it is impossible to be practically wise
without being good’’ (Nichomachean Ethics, VI 1144a).
You will recall that the goodness of the agent and specif-
ically the informational agent in terms of the possession of
a virtuous character, was discussed in (‘‘Information and
the good life’’) on the basis of the Argument from the
Goodness of Informational Agents (GIA). (See also Spence
2006, Ch. 10).
John Kekes seems to also have the view that a virtuous
character is an essential characteristic of the wise person.
In the opening sentence of his book Moral Wisdom and
Good Lives (1995, p. ix) Kekes tells us that ‘‘moral wisdom
is a virtue—the virtue of reflection’’. A more detailed
characterisation of moral wisdom by Kekes, is that
Moral wisdom is the capacity [a psychological
capacity] to judge rightly what should be done in
particular situations to make life better…Because this
human psychological capacity, once developed, is
likely to be lasting and important, it can be identified
as a character trait….We can say, therefore, that
people have moral wisdom if they regularly and
predictably act wisely in the appropriate situations
and if so acting is an enduring pattern in their
lives…Whether an action is morally wise depends
also on what the agents bring to the judgements they
make, such as their particular conception of what
would make life better. An action being morally wise
depends therefore not just on the nature of the action
and the situation, but also on the agent, and this
invalidates generalisations of moral wisdom which
ignore the character and beliefs of the agents. (1995,
5–7).
According to Kekes, moral wisdom is a second order
virtue whose primary concern,
[Is] the development of our character [emphasis
added] in a desirable direction by strengthening or
weakening some of our dispositions. First-order
virtues guide our actions in view of what we think of a
good life; second-order virtues guide our actions with
a view of developing the kind of character that reflects
a reasonable conception of a good life (1995, 9).
The psychology of wisdom: the Berlin wisdom paradigm
Finally, it is worth mentioning a psychological theory of
wisdom that runs parallel to the philosophical theories of
wisdom discussed above. This is the theory of wisdom
postulated by Paul Baltes and his research associates from
the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Ber-
lin. The theory known as the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm
views wisdom as a kind of expertise in the matters of
human life (Baltes et al. 2002, Baltes and Smith 1990 as
referred to by Banicki 2009). According to Banicki (2009),
wisdom as knowledge is viewed in the theory of the Berlin
Wisdom Paradigm as.
‘‘Integrative, Holistic and Balanced’’ (Baltes et al.
2002, p.342) and, as such, is intended to involve
cognitive, social, personal, motivational, emotional
and behavioral elements. Furthermore, the knowledge
in question is again strictly connected with judgment
and action. Accordingly, Baltes and Smith (1990,
p. 95) characterize wisdom as ‘‘expert knowledge
involving good judgment and advice’’ and associate it
with three main tasks in life: planning (future),
review (past) and management (present).
In a chapter from A Handbook of Wisdom: Psycholog-
ical Perspectives (Sternberg and Jordan 2005, p. 115)
Kunzmann and Baltes define wisdom in accordance with
the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm, as a
Highly valued and outstanding expertise in dealing
with fundamental, that is, existential, problems rela-
ted to the meaning and conduct of life (2005, 117).
Or as a
Special ‘‘expertise-like’’ case of the pragmatics of
intelligence (intellect) that includes knowledge about
cognitive, motivational, and emotional aspects of
adaptive functioning in a specific domain, that is, the
meaning and conduct of life (2005, 115).
Kunzmann and Baltes go on to elaborate that the ‘‘focus
of their theoretical work has been to define wisdom as an
expert system in human thought and behavior that coor-
dinates knowledge and virtue, mind and character’’
[emphasis added] (2005, p. 128), and that thus defined,
wisdom for them ‘‘reflects both components of wisdom:
intellect and character’’ (2005, p. 130). According to them,
‘‘wisdom differs from other human strengths in that it
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involves an orchestration of mind and virtue, intellect and
character’’ (2005, p. 131).
It is not too much of a jump to reasonably interpret the
psychological notion of the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm as
expressed above by Kunzmann and Baltes as parallel and
broadly in keeping with the general view of practical
wisdom I argue for in this paper: namely, as knowledge of
how to live well and the successful application of that
knowledge in living well (KLSA). To that, however, we
must also add the proviso that the knowledge in question
must also include some knowledge of facts concerning the
world generally and the world one experiences in specific
contexts. The (KLSA) you will recall is the philosophical
notion of wisdom I defended above, which is a re-formu-
lation of Ryan’s (KLS) view. Such knowledge does involve
an ‘‘orchestration’’, as in the case of Kunzmann and Baltes’
psychological notion of wisdom, of ‘‘intellect’’ or ‘‘cogni-
tion’’ (the epistemological features of wisdom in my
model) and virtue and character (the ethical, axiological
and eudemonic features of wisdom in my model).
The application of wisdom for the normative evaluation
of digital information in relation to the concept
of a good life
The story so far
The outcome of the extended argument concerning the
nature of wisdom, what wisdom is, and its relationship to
information and knowledge in section ‘‘Information,
knowledge and wisdom’’ is that wisdom is a special type of
meta-knowledge. Based on my re-formulation of Sharon
Ryan’s fourth theory of wisdom as knowledge and action
(KLS), I concluded that Wisdom is Knowing How to Live
Well and Successfully Applying that Knowledge in Living
Well (KLSA). Insofar as the ultimate purpose of a good life
is the attainment of eudemonia then wisdom, which
informs the conception of a good life and directs its active
pursuit for the attainment of eudemonia, is an essential
condition for both the conception and the attainment of a
good life. As the essential condition for both the concep-
tion and guided active pursuit and successful achievement
of the good life, wisdom is therefore established as the
essential conceptual connection between information and
the good life and in particular information that is minimally
necessary for acquiring knowledge of the things we need in
order to have a good life.13 Some general knowledge about
the world acquired on the basis of reliable and veridical
information that causes it and sustains it (Dretske 1999) is
therefore necessary for wisdom.
This, in turn, allows us to determine some of the generic
implications and ramifications of information for the con-
ception of a good life, in particular, a eudemonic concep-
tion of a good life. However, as Kekes points out, ‘‘the
eudemonic conception of a good life is not to be under-
stood as the endorsement of a particular form of life. It is
rather a regulative ideal that specifies some general con-
ditions to which all good lives must conform’’ [emphasis
added] (Kekes 1995, p. 24). As such, the eudemonic
account of a good life canvassed in this paper is broadly
speaking pluralistic as it is in principle compatible with
other different conceptions of a good life that meet the
same necessary general conditions to which any notion of a
good life must conform. For example, insofar as hedonistic,
desire-satisfaction and objective list theories of the good
life meet the minimal conditions for both specifying what a
good life is as well as providing the enabling conditions for
its practical realization, then they too can be aligned
broadly to the notion of wisdom developed in this paper.
Kekes’ claim cited above is insightful and very much in
keeping with the eudemonic conception of a good life
proposed and argued for in this paper on the basis of the
Dual Obligation Information Theory (DOIT) and the
Argument from the Goodness of Informational Agents
(GIA). For both DOIT and GIA are intended only as a
meta-theoretical regulative ideals that specify some gen-
eral conditions to which all good lives (and in particular
informational lives) must conform regardless of the par-
ticular contexts and contingencies of those lives.
Specifically, with regard to the creation and dissemi-
nation of information, central to those general conditions
to which all good lives are bound are (a) the epistemo-
logical and ethical obligations that emanate directly from
the inherent normative structure of information; (b) the
universal rights to freedom and wellbeing to which all
agents are entitled and which arise naturally from the
inherent normative structure of informational action; and
(c), the virtues of character and associated moral senti-
ments and values that are prudentially desirable and
required as enabling general motivational dispositions for
the pursuit of a good life for the ultimate attainment of
eudemonia.
In sum, we can say that those general meta-conditions
are encapsulated within the combined models put forth in
this paper, namely, those of DOIT and Wisdom (KLSA). I
will refer collectively to those theorems as the DOIT-
Wisdom model. That model moreover seems adequate for
the normative evaluation of an informationally good life.
Kekes correctly claims that according to a eudemonistic
conception of a good life,
13 I thank the reviewer of this paper for his useful suggestions in
helping me to more clearly formulate this paragraph.
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‘‘Primary values [values that concern uniform and
universal human goods and needs] may be thought of
as establishing the moral limits and secondary values
[values that vary across individuals in accordance
with differences in cultural traditions, conceptions of
a good life, and individual contingencies and cir-
cumstances] as establishing the moral possibilities
that define good lives (1995, 25)….the former define
a grid [emphasis added] within which human beings
must endeavour to make a good life for ourselves,
while the latter provide the ways in which individuals
fill in the grid’’ (1995, 23)
It has been the overall objective of this paper to provide
such a grid; namely, the DOIT-Wisdom model. Having
discussed meta-theoretically the epistemological, ethical,
axiological and eudemonic implications of information as a
process of communication for individuals and society
generally through the notion of wisdom in section ‘‘Infor-
mation, knowledge and wisdom’’, I will in this final part of
the paper apply the DOIT-Wisdom model to identify some
of the specific implications and ramifications that the pro-
duction, dissemination and communication of digital
information might have for the good lives of individuals
and society generally.
Why wisdom is of primary relevance to the evaluation
of digital information
The DOIT-Wisdom model presented in this paper for the
normative evaluation of information and its relation to the
good life is a model that applies to all information whether
digital or analogue regardless of whether such information
is generated within the old corporate media or the new
digital media. However, the exponential growth of digital
information in new media in recent years, especially on the
Internet, and its implications for the good life of individ-
uals and society generally, merits special attention for at
least three theoretical reasons.
There is, to begin with, a metaphysical or ontological
reason: The digitalization of information has extended the
natural and technological boundaries of our lives to such an
extent that as Luciano Floridi correctly observes we now
live in the infosphere (2002) and not just the biosphere. We
have essentially become and are increasingly becoming
informational beings or inforgs. As such, thousands of
millions of people around the world spend a great deal of
their lives, thinking, communicating, working, buying,
selling, playing, socializing and generally, acting infor-
mationally, online. All these numerous and varied infor-
mational activities in the infosphere, and specifically the
digital infosphere, are unavoidably related to the quality
and goodness of our lives, both as individuals and
collectively as societies. Hence, if wisdom is the concep-
tual link that normatively links information to a good life,
as argued in this paper, clearly then wisdom has a direct
and primary relevant role to play in the normative evalu-
ation of digital information and its relationship to a good
life in the infosphere. In particular, wisdom as phronesis or
practical wisdom, a reflective virtue that enables one to
exercise understanding and good judgment in one’s digital
informational choices and actions, with full appreciation of
the value of both the means and ends of those choices and
actions and their anticipated consequences for one’s life, is
essential for living a good life in the infosphere.14
Although not specifically writing on wisdom and its
essential role in the normative evaluation of digital infor-
mation and its impact on the good life, Shannon Vallor
does, however, draw attention to the important role that the
virtues generally play or ought to play in our online
behavior (Vallor 2010).
Secondly, there is a technological reason. The digiti-
zation of information allows us countless means and ends
for instantly creating and disseminating information around
the globe through the Internet and other technological
devices such as smart phones, for example. This unprece-
dented rapid and extensive dissemination of digital infor-
mation can and does affect the quality of our lives both
positively but also negatively. People can both benefit
themselves and others through the use of digital informa-
tion but they can also harm themselves and others through
the unreflective misuse and abuse of information.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss particular
such cases in detail but the following examples might
suffice to illustrate the type of unreflective and unwise
misuses of information that can occur and do occur to the
detriment of oneself and others: Until very recently, mar-
keting companies worldwide could access with Facebook’s
permission the personal information of its 500 million plus
members. Individual members on Facebook might not
know that their information is being accessed and pro-
cessed for marketing purposes and even if they do know
they don’t know who, why and how their personal infor-
mation is being used both presently and in the future.
‘‘Sexting’’ is increasingly becoming a major social problem
involving young people as the following two examples,
among many other cases, illustrate: a Sydney schoolgirl
agreed to her boyfriend’s request to take a photo of herself
naked and text it to him. A year later when they broke up
the boyfriend sent the picture to other students and people
outside the school. A similar case involved Jesse Logan an
14 I owe the suggestion of emphasizing the particular valuable role
that wisdom as the virtue of phronesis can play in enabling us to
exercise good judgment in our online informational choices and
conduct, to a reviewer of this paper.
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18 year-old from Ohio who hanged herself after an
ex-boyfriend distributed nude photos of herself she had
sent him by SMS, which her peers used to bully her (Carty
2009). The mask of anonymity afforded by cyberspace
communication has allowed for the creation and prolifer-
ation of a new form of insidious bullying, that of cyber
bullying in schools. A recent case involved cyber bullying
by students in a school in Australia. Two girls from the
private and prestigious Ascham school for girls in Sydney
were expelled from the school after it was established that
they had used the network site Myspace to use information
and post malicious comments about 31 other girls (Patty
2009). A doctor (general practitioner) in Dubbo, a country
town in Australia, posted three videos on You Tube under
the pseudonym Funnisean showing himself posing as a
female prostitute. This has angered a local member of
parliament, who described the doctor’s conduct as ‘‘unac-
ceptable behaviour’’ (Benson 2009). More recently, in
September 2010, Stephanie Rice, a treble Olympic gold-
medallist lost a major sponsorship with Jaguar because of
derogatory comments she made on Twitter concerning the
South African Rugby team. She had referred to them as
‘‘faggots’’ (Hosking 2010).
The uncritical and sometimes thoughtless dissemination
of a lot of trivial and personal information of oneself and
others on Social Network Sites (SNS) such as Facebook,
Myspace and You Tube as well as through SMS and
Twitter, as the above examples illustrate, might be not only
not conducive to wisdom and a good life overall, but det-
rimental to it. For they appear to encourage unreflective,
foolish and reckless behavior with no apparent compen-
sating axiological or eudemonic value for oneself, one’s
‘‘friends’’ and others. Given the pitfalls of creating and
accessing unreflectively information about oneself and
others, without any compensating realization of value in
relation to one’s conception of a good life, a wise person
would thus be best served in exercising caution when using
digital information. Such overall reflective caution is also
in keeping with one of wisdom’s essential characteristics,
namely, control; that is to say, the ability to narrow down
the areas in one’s life over which one has little or no
control so as to enlarge the areas of our lives that we can
order in conformity with our conception of a good life
(Kekes 1995). This is a process of self-knowledge, a pro-
cess of reflection involving judgments ‘‘whose aim is to
make our character less fortuitous and more deliberate’’
(Kekes 1995, pp. 127–28). When we allow ourselves to
unreflectively misuse digital information of ourselves and
others on the Internet and through the use of smart phones,
we make ourselves more ‘‘fortuitous’’ and less ‘‘deliber-
ate’’. In so doing, we become hostages to fortune since we
no longer have any control over that information, which
now for ever floats beyond our control in cyberspace.
Surely such unreflective conduct is not only not wise but
can in extreme circumstances be foolish and ultimately
self-defeating if, upon careful reflection, it undermines our
considered conception of a good life and that of its
realization.
A third reason why wisdom is of primary relevance to
an enquiry concerning the role that digital information
plays in a good life is that some of the issues with regard to
the use of digital information qua good life relate not pri-
marily to moral or immoral conduct by individuals towards
others but to the prudentially appropriate or inappropriate
conduct of the individuals in relation to themselves: or
more precisely what is good for them—good for their lives.
In short, such conduct might only constitute unwise or
foolish behavior and not necessarily unethical conduct,
although such unwise conduct may have unforeseen sec-
ondary unethical consequences for others. For example, if
an individual posts compromising pictures of themselves
on Facebook or Myspace that causes no harm to anyone
else but themselves, then the matter is not one of ethics but
one of wisdom or at least prudence15—how wise or prudent
was the individual to do so, if the outcome of their unwise
behavior in public cyberspace turned out to be harmful to
themselves in some unintended way. Say, as a result of
their unwise but not necessarily unethical conduct that
individual was fired from a job they enjoyed and relied
upon for their self-fulfillment. Just one recent example is
that of an upcoming journalist with the Age (a leading
newspaper in Australia) who was fired for a series of
unsavory but mostly silly ‘‘tweets’’ about various TV
personalities and celebrities (Bodey 2010). If the journalist
in question was a little wiser she would not have ruined her
career by such unwise but not strictly speaking unethical
conduct. We can at least assume that no unethical conduct
was intended and no harm befell the celebrities in question.
Wisdom as a type of second-order knowledge involves
reflection, sound judgment, and understanding in the use
and development of information in the form of first-order
knowledge (both knowledge-that and knowledge-how) to
be applied with the aim of guiding and directing our
thoughts and actions in the discovery and achievement of
what is of value for us in life, in relation to our overall
conception of a good life.
New Media, including the Internet and computers gen-
erally have made it possible for us to access and use
15 The term prudence used throughout this paper refers to the virtue
of prudence conceived as an enabling disposition or trait of character
that has the tendency of preventing an individual of engaging in
conduct that is likely to cause them harm—that is, conduct
unbecoming of a virtuous person. Unlike the term instrumental
rationality, which is a non-moral term and refers to the non-moral
self-interest of an individual, prudence by contrast refers to the
virtuous and hence moral self-interest of an individual person.
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extraordinarily and unprecedented large quantities and
varieties of information. This is indeed the age of infor-
mation. However, what seems to follow from our charac-
terization of wisdom above is that the uncritical access and
use of so much information without the appropriate
reflection, judgment and understanding, might not be
conducive to wisdom and consequently might not be con-
ducive to a good life for individuals or societies. Thus, the
uncritical accumulation and use of more information is not
necessarily conducive to more wisdom (because not
essential to it) and hence not more conducive to a good life.
On the contrary, sometimes we might be better off with
less information rather than more, especially if the former
is directed by wisdom (less information) and the latter is
not (more information).
Even in the case of critically accessing and using con-
textualized information, such information might also not be
conducive to wisdom and to a good life, if that information
is merely used instrumentally without a clear understand-
ing of the ends which that information is intended to
achieve or a clear understanding of the value of those ends.
Recall that wisdom not only directs the means but also the
ends of our actions. Thus the accessing and use of a lot of
contextualized information on our iPhone, for example,
without a clear understanding of the value of the ends for
which that information is to be used, might at best be
neutral with regard to the goodness of our lives and worse
detrimental to the goodness of our lives if it utilizes too
much of our cognitive and social resources for the acqui-
sition of information that ultimately is of little or no axi-
ological or eudemonic value for us personally and for
society at large.
Conclusion
The object of the paper has been to explore how information
generally and digital information specifically can be nor-
matively evaluated in relation to the concept of a good life.
To that end, the paper developed and applied a meta-theo-
retical model, the DOIT-Wisdom model, as a groundwork
for demonstrating how information can be normatively
evaluated, using a cluster of inter-related normative cate-
gories, including, the epistemic, ethical, axiological and
eudemonic categories, analyzed and defended on the basis
of that model. Central to those normative categories is the
concept of wisdom, which being at once a meta-epistemo-
logical, meta-axiological and meta-eudemonic concept,
establishes a direct conceptual link between information
and the notion of a good life both for individuals and
societies generally. More specifically, wisdom as the paper
demonstrated has a particular and important normative
relevant role to play in the evaluation of digital information.
The cited examples of the dissemination of digital infor-
mation on the Internet and other digital media in section
‘‘The application of wisdom for the normative evaluation of
digital information in relation to the concept of a good life’’
were used illustratively and as proof of concept to demon-
strate how the notion of wisdom as the essential conceptual
link between information and a good life can be used
methodologically to evaluate both axiologically and eude-
monically the creation, access, use and dissemination of any
type of digital information on the Internet and on computers
generally. Some digital informational evaluations such as,
for example, the use of Skype to communicate regularly
with close friends and family will be positive, given that
relationships with friends and family are conducive to a
good life and as such, their cultivation and maintenance is
generally, wise-worthy. Other digital informational evalu-
ations, such as the examples from Facebook, Myspace and
SMS and Twitter above, may prove negative because not
conducive to a good life and possibly conducive to a bad
life, and therefore not wise-worthy. Hence, wisdom in its
theoretical mode but also most importantly in its practical
mode as the reflective virtue of phronesis, is essential in
enabling us to exercise good judgment in our online
behavior, both with regard to our chosen informational
means and ends that are conducive to the pursuit and
attainment of a valuable good life, for us and for others.
Although descriptively it can be said that we are now
living in the age of information, prescriptively we should,
if we are wise or at least aspire to be wise, aim at pro-
moting the Age of Wisdom, both for our own sake and that
of others, and especially for the sake of future generations
who might mistake mere information for knowledge and
mere knowledge for wisdom. This paper has argued for a
theoretical groundwork for the normative evaluation of
information generally, and digital information specifically
through the notion of wisdom. No doubt a lot more work
must be accomplished in a more extensive examination and
evaluation of specific types of good and bad uses of
information that daily impact on the lives of people both
positively and negatively. As we adapt ourselves to live
more and more in the infosphere, including virtual worlds,
this becomes a desirable and indeed a necessary task. I
hope this is but the beginning of an ongoing research
project—a project that extends the scope of Information
Ethics to include the all-important Ethics of Wisdom.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which per-
mits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
274 E. H. Spence
123
References
Aristotle. (1941). Nichomachean ethics, the basic works of Aristotle
(pp. 935–1112). New York: Richard McKeon.
Baltes, P. B., & Smith, J. (1990). Toward a psychology of wisdom
and its ontogenesis. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Wisdom: Its nature,
origins, and development (pp. 87–120). New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Baltes, P. B., Gluck, J., & Kunzmann, U. (2002). Wisdom: Its
structure and function in regulating successful life span devel-
opment. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of
positive psychology (pp. 327–347). Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Banicki, K. (2009). The Berlin wisdom paradigm: A conceptual
analysis of a psychological approach to wisdom. History and
Philosophy of Psychology, 11(2), 25–36.
Benson, H. H. (2000). Socratic wisdom: The model of knowledge in
Plato’s early dialogues. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Benson, K. (2009). Doctor in hot water for posing as prostitute on




Bodey, M. (2010). Ousted columnist Catherine Deveny queries age





Carty, L. (2009). Parents get sex message, Sydney morning herald,
May, 3, 2009. http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/parents-
get-sext-message/2009/05/02/1240982472297.html?page=2. Accessed
6 Jan 2011.
Descartes, R. (1979). Principles of philosophy. In Philosophical
works of desacartes, (pp. 201–302) (E. Haldane, G. Ross, Eds.,
Trans.). London: Cambridge University Press.
Dretske, F. (1999). Knowledge and the flow of information. Stanford:
CSLI Publications.
Erasmus, D. (1994). In praise of folly (A. H. T. Levi, Ed., B. Radice,
Trans.). Penguin Classics.
Finnis, J. (1980). Natural law and natural rights. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Finnis, J. (1983). Fundamentals of ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Floridi, L. (2002). What is the philosophy of information? Metaphi-
losophy, 33, 123–145.
Floridi, L. (2005). Is semantic information meaningful data? Philos-
ophy and Phenomenological Research, LXX, 2.
Floridi, L., & Sanders, J. W. (2002). Mapping the foundation list
debate in computer ethics. Ethics and Information Technology,
4(1), 1–9.
Garrett, R. (1996). Three definitions of wisdom. In R. Lehrer, et al.
(Eds.), Knowledge, teaching, and wisdom (pp. 221–232).
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Gewirth, A. (1978). Reason and morality. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Gewirth, A. (1996). The community of rights. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Gewirth, A. (1998). Self-fulfillment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Hosking, W. (2010). Gay slur costs stephanie rice jaguar sponsorship
deal, herald sun, September 7, 2010. http://www.heraldsun.com.
au/entertainment/confidential/gay-slur-costs-stephanie-rice-jaguar-
sponsorship-deal/story-e6frf96x-1225914998070. Accessed 6 Jan
2011.
Kekes, J. (1983). Wisdom. American Philosophical Quarterly, 20(3),
277–286.
Kekes, J. (1995). Moral wisdom and good lives. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Kunzmann, U., & Baltes, P. (2005). The psychology of wisdom:
Theoretical and empirical challenges. In R. J. Stenberg & J. Jordan
(Eds.), A handbook of wisdom: Psychological perspectives. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Kvanvig, J. L. (2003). The value of knowledge and the pursuit of
understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lehrer, K., Lum, B. J., Slichta, B. A., & Smith, N. D. (Eds.). (1996).
Knowledge, teaching, and wisdom. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
Maxwell, N. (2007). From knowledge to wisdom (2nd ed.). London:
Pentire Press.
Nozick, R. (1989). What is wisdom and why do philosophers love it
so? The examined life (pp. 267–278). New York: Touchstone
Press.
Patty, A. (2009). Cyber bullies run amok at top school, Sydney
morning herald, May 8, 2009. http://www.smh.com.au/news/
technology/cyber-bullies-run-amok-at-top-school/2009/05/07/124
1289315388.html. Accessed 6 Jan 2011.
Plato. (1978). The Republic. In E. Hamilton & H. Cairns (Eds.), The
collected dialogues of Plato (pp. 575–844). Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Ryan, S. ( 1996). Wisdom. In Lehrer, et al. Knowledge, teaching, and
wisdom (pp. 233–242). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Ryan, S. (1999). What is wisdom? Philosophical Studies, 93, 119–139.
Ryan, S. (2007). Wisdom. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy.
Accessed 14 June 2010.
Spence, E. (2006). Ethics within reason: A neo-gewirthian approach.
Lanham: Lexington Books. (a division of Rowman and Littlefield).
Spence, E. (2009a). The epistemology and ethics of internet informa-
tion. In A. D’Atri & D. Sacca (Eds.), Information systems: People,
organizations, institutions, and technologies: ItAIS: The Italian
association for information systems. Heidelberg: Physica.
Spence, E. (2009b). A universal model for the normative evaluation of
internet information. Ethics and Information Technology, 11, 4.
Sternberg, R. J., & Jordan, J. (2005). A handbook of wisdom:
Psychological perspectives. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Tiberius, V. (2008). The reflective life: Living wisely with our limits.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vallor, S. (2010). Social networking technology and the virtues.
Ethics and Information Technology, 12(2), 157–170.
Varelius, J. (2004). Objective explanations of individual well-being.
Journal of Happiness Studies, 5, 73–91.
Vitek, B., & Jackson, W. (2008). The virtues of ignorance:
Complexity, sustainability, and the limits of knowledge. Ken-
tucky: The University Press of Kentucky.
Information, knowledge and wisdom 275
123
